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To satisfy the subjective component, the complaint must allege
that the officials were deliberately indifferent to the confinement
conditions. Here, the court found the subjective component satisfied
because Sheegog alleged the prison officials knowingly permitted a
hazardous condition to exist, did nothing about it, and failed to warn
inmates of the danger. Therefore, the court denied the motion to
dismiss with regard to all but three defendants, because those claims
did not address the maintenance of the prison's drinking water.
Adam B. Kehrli
Hoosier Envtl. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 953 (D.C. Ind. 2000) (upholding U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers' issuance of permits for riverboat gambling operation under
the Clean Water Act and Rivers and Harbors Act as a rational decision
within the Corps' discretion where Environmental Assessment
evidenced the Corps' awareness and acknowledgment of the
conflicting views of other federal agencies, yet Corps had reasonable
basis to disagree).
By referendum vote in 1994, the citizens of Harrison County,
Indiana, authorized a riverboat gaming operation, the only form of
legal gambling in Indiana, on the county's border along the Ohio
River. Shortly thereafter, Caesars Riverboat Casino, L.L.C. ("Caesars")
applied to the Indiana Gaming Commission ("IGC") for a license to
operate a riverboat gambling facility. In accordance with state and
federal law, Caesars also applied to the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") for permits under sections 403 and 404 of the
Clean Water Act ("CWA") and section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act ("RHA").
Through the preparation of an environmental assessment ("EA")
and the accompanying consultation and commenting process, the
Corps determined the proposed project would not have a significant
impact on the environment (formally referred to as a "finding of no
significant impact" or "FONSI") and issued the requisite permits. The
IGC then issued Caesars a site-specific "Certificate of Suitability" to
construct and operate a licensed riverboat gambling operation,
including a permanent mooring facility for the riverboat, an on-site
pavilion and hotel, parking and utility facilities, and a golf course.
Six months after construction began, three environmental groups,
including Hoosier Environmental Council, Inc. ("HEC"), initiated an
action challenging the Corps' decision to issue the permits.
Specifically, HEC alleged the Corps' decision to issue the permits
without preparing an environmental impact statement ("EIS"), or
conducting a sufficient public interest review, violated the
Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act
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("NEPA"), the CWA, and section 10 of RHA.
First, HEC alleged the Corps failed to adequately consider the
relevant indirect and cumulative impacts of the proposed projects as
required under NEPA, resulting in an arbitrary and capricious
HEC cited comments of the
decision to issue the permits.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") requesting the Corps
prepare an EIS to address EPA's concern related to the ecologically
sensitive nature of the project area. The court, however, pointed out
that the Corps, although obligated to address EPA's concerns, was not
bound by EPA's recommendations. Additionally, because EPA did not
exercise its section 404 veto power, the court could not justify
categorizing the Corps' decision as arbitrary and capricious.
Second, HEC alleged NEPA required the consideration of the
indirect impacts of potential secondary development resulting from
the proposed project. Again, the court rejected this argument and
found (1) the administrative record contained no factual evidence of
any foreseeable secondary development; and (2) the absence of such
evidence justified the Corps' finding that the project's intended
purpose, to provide a resort destination, would not spawn surrounding
HEC also claimed the social costs of
secondary development.
expanded casino gambling constituted an indirect impact requiring
consideration. The court held such effects to be beyond the purview
of the Corps, and already considered and approved by the citizens who
voted to allow riverboat gambling.
HEC next alleged the inadequacy of the Corps' cumulative impacts
analysis, including effects on both banks of the river, upstream effects,
and floodplain impacts. The court found the Corps' analysis sufficient
and reasoned that defining the extent and effect of cumulative impacts
and the geographic area in which they occur was a matter best left to
Absent evidence
the competency of experienced agencies.
demonstrating arbitrariness or total unreasonableness in the scope of
the Corps' review of cumulative impacts, its decision should not be
disturbed. In upholding the adequacy of the Corps' cumulative
impacts analysis, the court relied on the specific circumstances of the
project, including (1) the fact that all other riverboat casinos were
located at least 100 miles away; and (2) the necessary state agencies
had approved the proposed project.
HEC also challenged as inadequate the Corps' analysis of
alternatives to the proposed project as required under NEPA. The
court again considered the tentative approval of the IGC. Because the
ultimate licensing of the project depended on the IGC, alternatives
considered at the federal level could be appropriately limited to
alternatives acceptable to the IGC. Thus, IGC's designation of the
gaming license specifically to Harrison County justified the limitation
of the Corps' review of alternative sites to sites within Harrison County.
Additionally, as required under the CWA, the Corps sought practicable
alternatives to the discharge of dredged and fill material required at
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the proposed project site. The court determined that because every
alternative identified required similar discharges, the fact that the
selected site had the most practicable characteristics justified the
Corps' limited consideration of other alternatives.
Additionally, the court noted that when an EA confirms the nonsignificance of impacts of a proposed project, federal regulations do
not require the Corps to discuss alternatives if there are no unresolved
conflicts about resource use and the activity is water dependent. Thus,
because the court upheld the Corps' analysis under NEPA, the CWA,
and RHA, and the riverboat facility was water-dependent, and no issue
as to resource conflict had been raised, the court found the Corps'
alternatives analysis more than adequate.
HEC also challenged as insufficient the Corps' public interest
review completed prior to issuance of the permits. The court noted
that plaintiffs hold the burden of proving an agency abused its
discretion in the performance of a public interest review. Absent
affirmative evidence of such an abuse of discretion, an agency's
decision cannot be disturbed. Thus, in a reiteration of its reasoning
earlier in the opinion, the court upheld the Corps' methodical public
interest review.
Finally, HEC claimed the Corps erred in not completing an EIS for
the proposed project. The court rejected the notion that a lengthy EA
signifies an EIS is necessary. Instead, the court pointed to the Corps'
findings that reflect an "awareness and acknowledgment" of the
comments and concerns of other agencies through the consultation
process. The court found the Corps took a "hard look" at the impacts
of the proposed project, but nonetheless rationally disagreed with the
other agencies. Having based its FONSI on a rational, complete
analysis in the EA, the Corps' was not obligated to prepare an EIS.
Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Corps.
Lucinda Henriksen
Save the Valley, Inc. v. United States Envt'I Prot. Agency, 99 F. Supp.
2d 981 (D. Ind. 2000) (holding the Clean Water Act imposed a
mandatory duty upon the Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator to notify Indiana of problems with the State's National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") program and to
assume enforcement of NPDES permits upon the State's failure to
remedy the problems).
Save the Valley, Inc. ("Save the Valley") filed for injunctive relief
against the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and the Federal
Mandamus Statute. Save the Valley alleged that Indiana violated the
CWA by failing to require industrial hog farms (confined or

